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BOOK REVIEWS
LEGAL RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE. By Stanley S. Herr,
Stephen Arons, and Richard E. Wallace, Jr. Lexington, Ma.: Lex
ington Books 1983.

Reviewed by Robert D. Fleischner*.
In recent years there has been both a growing recognition that
people with menta] disabilities have legal rights) and an almost ex
ponential growth of their rights. But, as one· court has recognized,
"[w]ith no mechanism for assisting mentally disabled persons in en
forcing them, these rights might as well not exisC'2.
A critical issue, then, is how to transform the promise of new
rights into reality. Perhaps the most obvious way is to insure that the
professionals and paraprofessionals, the primary providers of serv
ices to mentally disabled people, are aware of their clients' rights and
are in a position to act to procure or protect those rights or to find
someone who can. It is apparently to that end thai Stanley S. Herr,
Stephen Arons and Richard E. Wallace, Jr. have written their new
book, Legal Rights and Mental Health Care. 3 The book isiinportant,
however, because it is something more than just a helpful 4eskman
ual for mental health workers. It is an attempt to make those work
ers more comfortable with the very idea of legal rights for their
• Assistant Director. Center for Public Representation. Northampton. MA; Super
visory Attorney. Disability Law Clinic. Western New England College School of Law.
B.A.• University of Massachusetts. Amherst. 1967; J.D.• Boston College School of Law.
1973.
1. We have. after all. recently completed. with remarkably little fanfare. the Na
tional Year of Disabled Persons (1982).
2. Brewster v. Dukakis. 520 F. Supp. 882. 889 (D. Mass. 1981). rev'd and remanded
on other grounds. 687 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1982).
3. S. HERR. S. ARONS & R. WALLACE. LEGAL RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH
CARE (expected publication Spring 1983). Stanley Herr is a noted advocate and com
mentator on the rights of people with mental handicaps. Professor Arons and Attorney
Wallace were once associated with the Mental Patients Advocacy Project. an independ
ent law office on the grounds of the Northampton State Hospital," Northampton,
Massachusetts.
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clients and with the role and place of advocates in the mental health
system.
Although "advocacy" is widely believed to be among the most
powerful weapons in the limited arsenal available to people with
handicapping conditions,4 the very concept of "advocacy" is the sub
ject of some broad disagreementS and fundamental misunderstand
ing. The word "advocacy" itself often seems to mean all things to all
people. For instance, in some residential programs and group
homes, the staff are called "advocates"; there is a growing "self-ad
vocacy" movement in which groups of formerly institutionalized
people come together to assert their rights from a position of
strength; Associations for Retarded Citizens, in particular, promote
programs of "citizen advocacy" which encourage friend relation
ships between an unpaid citizen and a person with retardation; pro
fessional and parent groups hold themselves out as "advocates" for
various disabled people; individual service providers, professional or
otherwise, define their role, in whole or part, as that of "client advo
cates";6 many human rights committees view their work as "client
advocacy"; and even a state agency may have its mission defined as
that of an "advocate."7 Consequently, it is not unusual, although it
can be disconcerting. to attend a meeting concerning services for a
person with handicaps at which all the participants announce them
selves to be that person's advocate but promptly proceed to espouse
diametrically opposite views about the person and his or her needs
and desires. 8
The confusion this causes is not necessarily the result of any
4. See, e.g.• S. HERR. THE NEW CLIENTS: LEGAL SERVICES FOR MENTALLY RE
TARDED PERSONS (1979); Legal Advocacy for Persons Confined in Mental Hospilals, 5
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 274 (1981) ("point-counterpoint" exchange between Sa
muel J. Brakel, research attorney with the American Bar Foundation and Steven J.
Schwartz and Robert D. Fleischner, attorneys with the Mental Patients Advocacy Pro
ject, Northampton, Massachusetts).
5. E.g., Legal Advocacy for Persons Confined in MenIal Hospilals, supra note 4.
6. For instance. the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health has argued that
its program of providing its clients with "service coordinators" or "case managers" fully
satisfies the client's advocacy needs. Brewster v. Dukakis, 520 F. Supp. 882, 891 (D.
Mass. 1981). rev'd and remanded on olher grounds, 687 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1982); see also J.
WESTMAN, CHILD ADVOCACY: NEW PROFESSIONAL RULES FOR HELPING FAMILIES
(1979) (arguing that advocacy should be added to the job descriptions of all planners and
providers of services).
7. See, e.g.• MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 28A, §§ 3-4 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982).
which created the Office for Children. a state agency charged with acting as an "advo
cate" for children in Massachusetts.
8. It is all too seldom that the disabled person is allowed to attend and thereby
straighten out the confusion. To its credit. the Massachusetts Department of Mental

1983)

BOOK REVIEW

591

thing evil. In fact, it is probably the product of a growing recogni
tion across the various professional disciplines· and, indeed,
throughout our society, that human dignity and legal rights are at
least as important to people with handicapping conditions as they
are to the rest of us. But the benevolent motivations of this broadly
defined community of advocates are not enough, in themselves, to
relieve the confusion, lessen the inevitable professional tensions, or
necessarily to result in anything meaningful for the client. The most
obvious problem caused by all of this is that far too much energy
and time are wasted in arguments about who speaks for whom, from
what professional, moral, or ethical perspective, and with what grant
of authority.9
Of course, "advocates" are people wJ:~,o work within the mental
health care delivery system itself. But ironically, as Herr, Arons, and
Wallace recognize, the most serious threat to patients' human rights
lies in the highly bureaucratized settings in which mental health care
is often organized. Since nearly every important decision about a
mentally disabled person's life will be made from within the context
of that bureaucracy, there can be palpable discord when an
"outside" advocate intrudes and demands either something more
than the bureaucracy is willing to grant or something the bureau
cracy believes not to be in its client's "best interest." Consequently,
the "advocates" are often at each other's throats.
The situation just described need not be so. With the publica
tion of their book, Herr and his colleagues have taken sizeable step
toward the reduction, though hardly the elimination, of these poten
tially destructive misunderstandings. Legal Rights and Menial
Health Care is an up-to-date, comprehensive, readable, and copi
ously documented work which explains the authors' views of the role
of "outside" primarily legal, advocates and the tools-their client's
. legal rights-with which they labor. Since the book's intended audi
ence is mental health professionals, it is written without the legalese
which that audience can find so troubling. Nevertheless, the mate
rial will be of value to lawyers, clients, and interested citizens as well.
For the greater part of the book, the authors have carefully sur
veyed and explained most of the important legal rights which affect
the lives of people labeled as mentally ill. In this regard, it is partic-

a

Health has promulgated regulations mandating client attendance at so-called "Individual
Service Planning" meetings. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 104. §§ 16.05(2), 21.46 (\980).
9. Such internecine struggles. of course, are nothing new. See Wald & Freidman,
The Politics ofMental Health Advocacy in the United States. I INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
137 (1978).
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ularly encouraging and somewhat innovative that the rights of cli
ents of community programs are given space and treatment equal to
that of their institutionalized counterparts. The chapters on the right
to treatment,IO the right to refuse treatment, II the special problems
and rights of children, the principle of the least restrictive alterna
tive,12 issues of privacy, confidentiality and access to records, anti
discrimination laws, and guardianship and other protective services
are quite excellent. The chapters are filled with information that
should be of great value to clinician and lawyer alike. 13 But aside
from the usefulness of these informative chapters, the book's more
deeply obvious value lies in the authors' efforts to interpret the na
ture of advocacy, to illuminate the difficult concepts of competency
and consent, and to explain why it is that mental patients' rights
should be taken seriously.
In what may be their most provocative chapter, the authors de
scribe what they believe to be fundamental principles which must be
maintained if advocacy is to be true to its own ethics and useful to its
clients. For the authors, the cardinal principle is that the advocate's
sole loyalty is to his or her client. In practice, this largely inflexible
rule is often the one which troubles mental health professionals be
cause they must often "balance their loyalty to their clients with bu
reaucratic demands, programatic responsibilities and professional
10. The Supreme Court's recent and discouragingly narrow decision in Youngberg
v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982), is fully analyzed in this chapter.
I J. The chapter on the right to refuse treatment compares the decision in Rennie v.
Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) with Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass.
1979), affd in pari rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub
nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
The Rogers case is currently pending before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa
chusetts upon certification of questions from the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
The certified questions involve, inter alia, the status of Massachusetts law regarding insti
tutionalized mental patients in light of a Supreme Judicial Court decision establishing
that mentally ill people living in the community have a right to refuse psychotropic medi
cation. In re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). See
5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 565 (1983). Therefore, through no fault of the authors, this
chapter may well be out of date not long after it is published.
12. This chapter is a useful and accurate description of the lengthy litigation in
Brewster v. Dukakis, No. 76-4423-F, (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 1978) (Consent Decree). 544 F.
Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1982) (describing decree and awarding fees).
13. Many mental health professionals may be disappointed that the book gives
such brief coverage to questions of professional liability . The only issue addressed in this
regard is that of confidentiality and the dangerous client. Many clinicians are concerned
about whether they are likely to be sued for what they do or fail to do. Nevertheless. this
book is about the rights of the client; "clinicians' rights" should be, and are. addressed
elsewhere. See, e.g., A. VAN BIERVllET & I. SHELDON- WILGEN. LIABILITY ISSUES 1/\
COMMUNITY BASED PROGRAMS (1981).
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judgments that what the client wants may not be what the client
needs." 14 Yet without the rule, both advocate and client are lost.
The authors carefully and clearly explain the overriding need for
confidentiality and trust in the advocate-client relationship and show
that to maintain that trust, the advocate cannot serve two masters.
Since probably few clinicians would want to define their rule in very
different terms, this account is a helpful point of departure for a
.
deeper understanding of the advocate's role.
Similarly, the authors believe that the advocate can function ef
fectively only if he or she works from a presumption of client auton
omy. This presumption means that the advocate should follow the
expressed wishes of the client and must regard the client as a person
possessed of all of the legal rights of any other citizen. 15 Since most
clinicians are trained to look behind the expressed wishes of their
clients to find the "true" or "deeper" meaning of what is being said,
this presumption is for them a particularly difficult one to fathom.
The advocate's emphasis on "rights" and "autonomy" may be main
tained, from the clinician's view at least, at the expense of the client's
health, sanity, safety, or best interest. The resulting conflict between
the lawyer-advocate and the clinician-advocate can be spirited. The
authors are honest with their readers and recognize that there is
probably no way to eliminate this tension, short of one side or the
other either fundamentally altering its professional ethic or getting
out of the business altogether. Probably the best result would be a
deeper mutual understanding of the differences in professional ori
entation and a more quiet debate in an atmosphere that recognizes
the full extent of shared goals; one that ultimately leads to something
of value to the client. 16
14. Nor is the most conscientious advocate necessarily free from counterveiling
pressures. For instance, some advocacy offices may choose not to represent clients in
volved in a panicular kind of case, (e.g. medication refusals), so as not to rock the institu
tional boat. Brakel, Legal Aid in Mental Hospitals, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 23.
63. Even those advocates who avoid such obvious co-optation cannot help but have their
effons subtly affected by their own values, their need to preserve their own mental health
and their desire to assure the future of their project. Thus, it is well wonh striving for the
authors' overriding goal of "sole loyalty" as a criteria for choosing among cases.
15. The authors of Legal Rights and MenIal Health Care recognize, as they must,
that these presumptions are overcome by a legal declaration of incompetency, such as the
appointment of a guardian.
16. The other fundamental principles of advocacy discussed by tbe authors are:
confidentiality of communication between client and advocate; an attitude of profession
alism t0ward mental health staff and systems; regular and dependable physical access to
clients; and the ability and willingness to pursue the full range of remedies for a client's
complaint.
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Legal Rights and Mental Health Care is a positive step forward
in that process. The book's essential morality, that mental patients
have a right to dignity and to be treated like human beings, cannot
be denied. The essential ideal, that mentally handicapped people
can benefit from assertive advocacy, is likewise beyond dispute. Yet
its essential hope, that all the professionals, including advocates, who
have such inordinate power over the lives of handicapped people
will be able to labor for the client in an atmosphere of compassion,
mutual trust and understanding, remains unfullfilled.

